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I. Introduction 
 
 
 
We cannot stop natural calamities, but we can and must better equip individuals 
and communities to withstand them.  Those most vulnerable to nature’s wrath are 
usually the poorest, which means that when we reduce poverty, we also reduce 
vulnerability. 
  - Kofi Annan, Former UN Secretary-General, October 12, 2005 
 
Kofi Annan’s 2005 International Day for Disaster Reduction message followed a year of 
natural catastrophes including, among others, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that 
claimed over 280,000 lives, drought and locust plagues across Africa, devastating 
hurricanes and cyclones in the United States and Caribbean (including Hurricane 
Katrina), and heavy flooding across Europe and Asia. Annan’s message focused on 
recognizing the potential of micro-finance to reduce disaster risk and to improve disaster 
management; he promoted disaster micro-insurance as an “innovative approach” in this 
field (Annan, 2005).  
 This message reflects the shifting focus from ex poste disaster aid to ex ante 
assistance in risk mitigation and risk financing. Stronger focus on preemptive mitigation 
and financing strategies is increasingly important in what experts are calling a “new era 
of large-scale catastrophes;” in recent years, extreme weather events have been occurring 
at an accelerating pace (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2008). Over the past fifty years 
there have been significantly increasing trends in economic losses, insured losses, and 
fatalities from natural catastrophes around the world (Appendix A, Figure 1). The 
primary drivers of these trends are changes in land use and increasing concentration of 
people and capital in vulnerable areas (Mechler, 2005). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
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Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report also concludes that climate change 
has likely contributed to increasing incidences of natural catastrophes (IPCC 2007).  
The impacts of these natural catastrophes are most devastating and enduring in 
developing countries. 90% of the most devastating disasters between 1970 and 2007, 
ranked by number of victims, occurred in developing countries (Hochrainer et al, 2009) 
(Appendix A, Table 1). In absolute terms, economic losses due to natural catastrophes are 
greatest in developed countries, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
however, catastrophes inflict higher proportional losses in developing countries. A major 
natural catastrophe in an industrialized country will have a minor impact on GDP (e.g. 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted in a 1.1% GDP loss in the United States); at the other 
extreme, small island nations can incur damages representing several times their annual 
GDP (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2008) (Appendix A, Table 2). 
 High fatality rates and high proportional GDP losses are two indicators of the 
destruction caused by natural catastrophes in developing countries. The impact of natural 
catastrophes in these countries, however, is much greater and enduring than these 
measures may imply. Natural catastrophes prohibit economic development and 
exacerbate cyclical poverty; in the event of a natural catastrophe, the poor may have to 
sell assets (e.g. livestock), spend savings or default on loans, and cope with concurrent 
shocks such as illness (Mechler et al, 2006). Many rely on family networks for support, 
but families are often geographically concentrated and have highly covariant exposures to 
natural catastrophes. Furthermore, foreign investment in developing countries remains 
low partially because investors are averse to taking on the risk of loosing infrastructure 
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investments, and small firms and farms are unable to access credit to invest in higher-
risk, higher-yield activities (Mechler et al, 2006).  
 The closer that a community’s livelihood is tied to the weather, the greater its 
exposure to risk of climatic variability and extremes; for example, many rural 
communities in sub-Saharan Africa rely largely on rain-fed agriculture or pastoralism and 
struggle to cope with climatic variability (Cooper et al, 2008).  These vulnerable 
populations face immense challenges to adapting to climate change. This research paper 
focuses on developing flexible, long-term strategies for reducing vulnerability, improving 
resilience, and enabling adaptation to natural catastrophes and climate change of such 
farmers in the West African country of Senegal.  
Section II discusses the decline of agriculture in Senegal and the climatic 
conditions currently faced by the Senegalese farmers. Section III addresses the predicted 
impacts of climate change on West Africa and the West African agricultural sector. 
Section IV discusses the development of agricultural insurance internationally as well as 
highlights a successful index-based insurance pilot program in Malawi. It also highlights 
challenges to establishing agricultural insurance in developing countries and suggests 
criteria for designing agricultural insurance programs. Section V explains the 
development of agricultural insurance in Senegal and issues with the current country 
strategy. Section VI discusses stated needs of Senegalese farmers and an innovative food 
security program being developed in the country. Section VII builds on Section V 
through a proposed long-term strategy for developing agricultural insurance in Senegal. 
Section VIII offers some concluding remarks of the author.  
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II. Current Climatic Conditions and the Agricultural Sector in Senegal  
 
 
 Senegal is located in West Africa, one of the most food-insecure regions in the 
world (Brown et al 2009). According to the World Food Program’s 2009 Hunger Map, 
undernourishment is “Moderately High” in Senegal, with between 20-34% of the 
population chronically undernourished (WFP 2009). Approximately 58% of the 
Senegalese population lives rurally; 70% of this rural population depends on agriculture 
(Mahul et al 2009). Despite rural inhabitants’ high dependence on agriculture, agriculture 
comprises less than 10% of Senegal’s GDP. The productivity of this sector has been 
steadily declining over the past 25 years: average yearly crop loss values have increased 
from about 5% in 1986 to approximately 14% in 2008 (Mahul et al 2009), and Peace 
Corps estimates that current average yields of Senegal’s main crops are 2-6 times less 
than their potential (Peace Corps 2009).  
 The Senegalese agricultural sector is comprised primarily of smallholder farmers 
practicing rain-fed cultivation; currently less than 5% of cropped area is irrigated (Mahul 
et al 2009). As the primary irrigated crop, rice enjoys much more stable production than 
the other seven main Senegalese crops: millet, groundnut, maize, sorghum, cotton, 
cassava, and cowpea. These seven crops are highly exposed to drought and/or flooding, 
and their yearly production varies greatly with the weather. According to a 2004 survey 
of 1500 rural households conducted by a consultant to the Senegalese Government, 
approximately 30% of rain-fed Senegalese farmers reported drought as the primary cause 
of crop loss, followed by insects (16%) and diseases (13%) (Mahul et al 2009).  
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 Rainfall is spatially, temporally, and interannually highly variable in Senegal. The 
rainy season lasts from June through October and the dry season from November through 
May. The rainy season in the north of the country is approximately two months shorter 
than that in the south of the country. Historically, the southern-most regions of Senegal 
receive up to 1300 mm of rain per year and the northern-most regions of the country 
receive less than 300 mm of rain per year, with departments receiving more rain the 
further south that they are located (Roux and Sagna 2000). See Appendix A, Figure 2 for 
a country map of rainfall. During the period 1986 to 2003, however, in many departments 
average rainfall was significantly lower than the long-term average. Rainfall is also 
highly variable between years. In the northern-most departments, the coefficient of 
variation for rainfall can be as high as 40-45%, decreasing to 30-35% in the central 
departments, and falling to 25% in the southern departments. During the aforementioned 
period of lower-than-average rainfall, rainfall tended to be less variable between years 
(Mahul et al 2009). See Appendix A, Table 3 for these data.  
 Commercial agriculture is only possible in the northern regions of Senegal 
because of irrigation from the Senegal River; rain-fed agriculture is concentrated in the 
central and southern regions of Senegal. As noted above, rice is the primary irrigated 
crop. Millet is the most-grown rain-fed crop, consisting of 36% of total average 
cultivated area. While millet is primarily a food crop, the second-most grown crop, 
groundnut, which covers an average of 32% of total cultivated area, is both a food and a 
cash crop (Mahul et al 2009). The remaining crops, cotton, sorghum, maize, rice, cowpea, 
and cassava, all contribute less than 10% each to total cultivated area. The long-term 
trend of decreasing cropped area has continued recently, total cultivated area has declined 
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from 2.25 million hectares in 2005/06 to 1.95 million hectares in 2007/08 (Appendix A, 
Table 4). The production of some crops, such as cowpea (primarily used for animal feed), 
millet, and groundnut saw the greatest decreases in area cultivated, while the area 
cultivated for a couple of others, such as cassava and maize, actually increased (Mahul et 
al 2009).  
Although rainfall variability explains a large portion of the weak Senegalese 
agricultural sector, it is not the sole factor impacting production. A variety of factors 
interact to decrease production, including price instability of agricultural products, 
decreasing soil fertility and deterioration of ecosystems, limited interest of the private 
sector to invest in agriculture, and limited access to agricultural credit for farmers (Mahul 
et al 2009). Indeed, Chris Hendrick, the Director of Peace Corps Senegal, notes that 
Peace Corps volunteers have found that although low production is usually attributed to 
low rainfall, poor soil quality is also very much to blame; Peace Corps volunteers have 
implemented environmental education and agro-forestry programs to combat this 
problem (2010). The combination of these factors and climatic variability has resulted in 
the Senegalese agricultural sector being “left behind.” Yields have remained low and 
variable for the past 50 years (with the exception of rice), with no consistent yield 
increase trends. Over the past 10 to 15 years, groundnut yield has trended downward 
(Mahul et al 2009). See Appendix A, Figure 3 for national average yields of major crops 
from 1970/71 to 2007/08.  
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III. Predicted Impacts of Climate Change on West Africa and Agriculture 
 
 
 An outdated agricultural sector is not unique to Senegal. West African countries 
have largely suffered the same low productivity and yields (Appendix A, Figure 3) and 
the region is a net food importer (Brown et al 2009). The poor performance of the West 
African agricultural sector leaves it highly vulnerable to climate change. Rising 
temperatures and changing rainfall patterns may reduce agricultural output by 28% by 
2080, exacerbating food insecurity and malnutrition (Willoughby et al 2009). 
Temperatures have been rising in Africa faster than the global average, and this trend is 
expected to continue. Although temperature increase varies with region, Senegal is 
located in a low elevation, semi-arid zone that is expected to warm more than the moister 
tropics (there is some sub-humid territory in the south of the country). Temperatures are 
rising during all seasons; Senegal could see yearly average temperatures rise by 3-5° 
Celsius by the end of this century (Conway 2009).  
The stress induced by higher temperatures will be compounded by more variable 
rainfall. Although experts agree that rainfall extremes such as flooding and drought will 
occur more often, there is no consensus on whether yearly rainfall will increase or 
decrease in Senegal (Conway 2009). A recent report for the World Bank, for example, 
uses two different Atmospheric-Oceanic Global Circulation Models, the Canadian 
Climate Centre (CCC) and the Parallel Climate Model (PCM), with the A2 Emissions 
Scenario from the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). Although both predict that on average, summer rainfall decreases and 
winter rainfall increases, the CCC model predicts a 15% annual decrease in mean rainfall 
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and the PCM a 10% annual increase in mean rainfall (Seo et al 2008). See Appendix A, 
Figure 5 for temperature and rainfall maps illustrating these predictions.  
It is difficult to asses the extent to which climate change will impact African 
farmers. The aforementioned analysis by a World Bank team predicts that depending on 
the scenario, climate change benefits farmers in certain climate zones and hurt farmers in 
others. Because of Senegal’s location at the juncture of multiple climate zones (Appendix 
A, Figure 6), it is especially unclear what the impact of climate change will be on the 
country. It is likely, however, that different regions in Senegal will experience varied 
climatic changes. Higher temperatures and decreasing summer rainfall, for example, will 
pose challenges to rain-fed farmers in central and northern Senegal who already 
experience drought stress. Many other environmental factors affected by climate change, 
such as soil nutrients and carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere, will also 
impact crop production (Rasmussen 2001). The extent to which farmers are affected by 
climate change will depend on their location as well as their ability to adapt. 
 
 
IV. International Experience with Agricultural Insurance  
 
 
 
 In recent years, index-based agricultural insurance programs have been growing 
in popularity among non-profit and international organizations as well as developing 
country governments seeking to reduce farmers’ vulnerability to weather extremes. These 
products are also being used to enable farmers to access agricultural credit (Mapfumo 
2008). Index-based agricultural insurance is distinct from traditional agricultural 
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insurance, which has a long history in industrialized countries (e.g. United States and 
Canada) as well as some developing countries (e.g. India and Mexico).  
Traditional agricultural insurance is often sold to individual farmers in named-
peril or multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) forms. Named-peril insurance products, 
such as hail insurance, have successfully been sold through the private market. MPCI, 
however, is very costly to administer because the multitude of risks covered requires farm 
visits to determine the level of loss (Mahul et al 2009). The dilemma with MPCI 
programs is that adequate monitoring to control adverse selection and moral hazard is 
very costly, but if these problems are not addressed, indemnities will likely exceed 
collected premiums. In both cases, these programs require high levels of government 
subsidization to ensure availability of MPCI and to encourage farmer participation 
(Mahul et al 2009).  
 The high cost of traditional agricultural insurance programs spurred the 
development of index-based products that are more affordably administered in 
developing countries. An index-based insurance product is based on a measurable 
parameter, such as yield or rainfall, and farmers receive a payout when the index is below 
a specified trigger, regardless of actual losses in their fields. Appendix 2, Figure 1 
illustrates this product. Benefits of this product includes less moral hazard and adverse 
selection, lower administrative costs, standardized and transparent structure, availability 
and negotiability, reinsurance capability, and versatility (Mahul et al 2009). The primary 
challenge of this product is basis risk, or lack of correlation between the index and actual 
losses. Other challenges to developing index-based insurance in developing countries 
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include precise actuarial modeling, education, market size, weather cycles, 
microclimates, and forecasts (Mahul et al 2009).  
 Index-based agricultural insurance is just beginning to develop in Africa; in the 
past decade, there have been a number of pilot programs in African countries supported 
by organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and 
large non-profit organizations (e.g. Oxfam). A 2009 study by the Microinsurance 
Innovation Facility found that less than 80,000 people in Africa are covered by 
agricultural insurance products (including livestock, crop, and agriculture-related index 
products); this number represents less than 0.1% of the potential market for these 
products. The study concludes, however, that index-based products, “…offer the potential 
of a major breakthrough for agriculture” (Matul et al).  
Recent notable index-based insurance pilot programs include a small 2006 pilot 
program by the World Bank Commodities Risk Management Group (CRMG) in Ethiopia 
that had some success and highlighted challenges to establishing agricultural insurance 
programs (Bryla 2009). A more relevant and very successful pilot program in Malawi in 
2005/2006 also employed a weather-index product in a bundled package with a loan for 
agricultural inputs (Suarez et al 2007). This program will be discussed at length in the 
paragraphs below. In 2009 the United Nations Development Program began a partnership 
with multiple organizations in Mali to establish an agricultural insurance program with 
the goal of improving food security. Appendix 2, Table 1 contains an in-depth 
examination of these and other pilot and established agricultural insurance programs in 
developing countries. 
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 Index-based agricultural insurance products take many forms. The product offered 
depends on the risks confronting farmers as well as the goals of the program offering the 
insurance. As noted above, one program that is most relevant to an initial stage of 
agricultural insurance in Senegal is the 2005/2006 Malawi pilot. Malawi has a large rural 
population that is dependent on rain-fed farming. Since 1970, increasingly frequent 
floods and droughts are blamed for exacerbating poverty levels and trapping many rural 
farmers in a cycle of poverty and vulnerability. The removal of subsidies and 
privatization of seed companies have also blocked smallholder farmers’ access to quality 
inputs. For these and other reasons, Malawi is one of the most food-insecure countries in 
Southern Africa (Suarez et al 2007). 
 Recognizing the challenging weather conditions and market failures facing 
smallholder farmers, the World Bank CRMG, in collaboration with local stakeholders 
and assisted by the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) piloted 
a weather insurance scheme to enhance groundnut farmers’ ability to manage drought 
risk and to access credit (Suarez et al 2007). Farmers in four villages were offered 
bundled loan and insurance contracts designed to transfer the risk of rainfall deficit 
during the growing season to the insurer; 982 farmers decided to participate. Suarez et al 
illustrate the structure of the pilot through a series of 11 steps, which are listed below and 
illustrated in Appendix 2, Figure 1.  
Step 1: Farmer and his respective local farmers’ club agree to join scheme. 
Step 2: Farmer enters into a loan agreement with the local bank. A weather 
insurance premium is bundled with his loan. When a farmer joins the scheme, he 
commits to selling his harvest to the National Smallholder Farmers Association of 
Malawi (NASFAM) at the end of the season (ensuring a market for his harvest as 
well as repayment of his loan).  
Step 3: Insurance is purchased on behalf of the NASFAM clubs. 
Step 4: Farmer signs a form authorizing the bank to pay NASFAM for the seeds. 
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Step 5: NASFAM distributes the groundnut seed to participating clubs. 
Step 6: NASFAM is paid for seed expense by the bank. 
Step 7: At the end of the growing season, the rainfall information collected by the 
Malawi Meteorological Service is distributed to the insurer, NASFAM, and the 
bank. 
Step 8: If insufficient rainfall triggers payouts, then the corresponding payout is 
given by the insurer to the correct bank.  
Step 9: Farmer sells groundnut crops to NASFAM.  
Step 10: NASFAM pays off loan balance to the bank. 
Step 11: Any additional revenue from the sale is given to the farmers’ club.     
 
There are a few notable features of this structure. First, farmers do not handle money 
unless they receive additional revenue from the sale of their crops at the end of the 
growing season. NASFAM repays the entire loan balance unless the index is triggered, in 
which case the insurer repays part of the loan. Second, the insurance contract in this 
scheme is a vehicle for farmers to access credit for seed inputs; without this insurance 
contract, local banks are not willing to lend to farmers because of the risk of default in the 
case of drought. Thus, the insurance contract assures that the bank will receive repayment 
as well as interest on its loan while protecting farmers from defaulting in the case of 
drought. Third, although the bundled loan contract is signed by individual farmers, 
farmers’ clubs are collectively liable to cover the deficit of any member farmers who do 
not deliver their crops to NASFAM; using social collateral to ensure repayment of loans 
is a core concept of micro-finance (Suarez et al 2007).   
 Contracts in the pilot were sold in units of 32 kilograms of hybrid groundnuts 
(worth about $28.80 US), which plants 0.5 acres, a small part of the farmer’s total 
cultivated land. Although the insurance premium and the interest on the loan constitute 
approximately 10% of farmers’ expected revenue (without drought), the farmer could still 
expect a significantly higher net profit than with traditional seeds (Suarez et al 2007). See 
Appendix 2, Table 2 for the economics of the bundled package. In the case of no drought, 
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farmers could expect a net gain of $63.78 on the package, compared to $30.72 with 
traditional seeds. In the case of drought, farmers would not loose with the hybrid seed 
package, but would loose $10.24 with traditional seeds (Suarez et al 2007). In the context 
of farmers with little to no accumulated wealth, this difference could significantly impact 
their families’ well-being.  
Another major benefit to this program is that it does not rely on direct 
subsidization. Although the World Bank covered a substantial amount of start-up and 
administrative expenditures, the program did not require any direct premium 
subsidization. In light of the high costs that governments typically incur to subsidize 
agricultural insurance programs, this advantage could be very beneficial for the upscaling 
and the sustainability of similar agricultural insurance programs. As the economics of this 
program clearly highlight, it is a major advancement for index-based insurance in Africa. 
A World Bank representative went as far as to state: 
This is a breakthrough. We want farmers to adopt high return technologies 
that allow them finally to make the leap and accumulate earnings over 
time. Correlated risk is the factor impeding this…This Malawi transaction 
shows that there is a sustainable way to take the big rocks out of the way – 
drought risks – and clear the path to development! (in Suarez et al 2009) 
 
 Despite its success, the Malawi program highlighted some challenges to 
establishing agricultural insurance programs in developing countries. The system depends 
on higher quality seeds being made available to farmers; if seeds are defective, then the 
high costs of the loan interest and insurance premium will hurt farmers. The scheme 
actually experienced this problem, but it was quickly remedied by NASFAM (Suarez et 
al 2007). Another important issue is price volatility of agricultural products. If the market 
price for crops is higher at the end of the growing season than the pre-agreed contract 
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price, then farmers will be reluctant to sell their crops to NASFAM. As a result, farmers 
may side-sell crops to other traders. Although market price was higher than contract price 
at the end of the 2005/2006 season, only a few farmers broke their contract with 
NASFAM; the incident revealed, however, that the system is vulnerable to this problem 
(Suarez et al 2007).  
 NASFAM played a central role in insuring the success of this program; although 
it had the institutional capacity to handle its responsibility, it is unique to Malawi, and it 
may be difficult finding comparable organizations in other developing countries. 
Furthermore, because NASFAM is the essential bridge between the banks and insurers 
and the farmers, it must be trusted by both groups. If this trust erodes, the whole system is 
at risk. Finally, some farmers were disappointed when the insurance did not pay out, 
which demonstrated their incomplete understanding of the function of insurance. This 
problem may also reflect basis risk in the insurance system. Measurements of rainfall at 
two farms seven kilometers away from each other within 20 km of a weather station were 
much lower than the rainfall measured at the weather station (Suarez et al 2007).          
 The Malawi example highlights some important benefits and challenges to 
agricultural insurance programs. Discussing other agricultural insurance programs in 
detail is beyond the scope of this paper, although some key insights from these 
experiences can be noted: 
 Farmer education is imperative: Farmers lack understanding of insurance and 
financial products and mistrust insurance companies. Smallholder farmers are 
often unwilling to pay premiums for a stand-alone product and do not understand 
why premiums are not returned if there is no payout (Mapfumo, 2008). 
Boudreau  The Wharton School 
  University of Pennsylvania 
 16 
 Market-structure matters: Improving resilience to natural disasters and increasing 
yields can not fix other market failures that farmers encounter. Agricultural 
insurance works best in conjunction with other strategies to address market issues. 
 Basis risk is always a concern: As discussed above, basis risk is a primary 
concern when designing index-based contracts. Many countries lack sufficient 
data for large-scale agricultural insurance programs, and investment in new 
technology, cleaning of data, and upgrading of infrastructure is necessary (Bryla 
2009). Furthermore, experience in the field shows that even with continual 
minimization of basis risk, farmers will believe that local weather-station data 
does not accurately reflect climatic conditions on their farms (Mahul 2010).   
 Delivery channels, partner organizations, and insurers may lack capacity: It can 
be difficult to find a delivery channel with sufficient balance of interest in the 
product, outreach to the farmers, and technical capacity to serve as the partner and 
intermediary for an agricultural insurance product (Bryla 2009). Different types of 
organizations may have strengths in different countries (i.e. MFIs have strong 
presences in some countries, farmers’ clubs in others, and cooperatives in still 
others), and multiple channels should be considered. National insurance 
companies likely lack experience in agricultural insurance and may be reticent to 
take on risk in this area. They may also lack skills in product design and require 
training to design products that are appropriate for their clients’ risk.  
 There is little empirical research on the impacts of agricultural insurance on 
farmers’ livelihoods. A small, informal survey of smallholder farmers in Malawi 
conducted by the private insurance intermediary MicroEnsure found that those 
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who participated in the bundled loan/insurance scheme reported significant 
increases in yields as well as cultivated areas on farm. All farmers also introduced 
at least one cash crop; some reported investing in barns, oxen, home expansion, or 
carts. Others noted sending their children to school and opening savings accounts 
(Mapfumo 2008). This survey is anecdotal and likely represents a best-case 
scenario.  
The Malawi experience and these insights highlight that there are both benefits and 
challenges to developing agricultural insurance programs. As noted by Mahul and 
Stutley, agricultural insurance is part of a comprehensive risk management framework; it 
can contribute to the modernization of agriculture. Agricultural insurance can not, 
however, operate in isolation (2010).  
A recent report by the Economics of Climate Adaption (ECA) Working Group 
proposes systematic, risk-management based approaches for policy-makers to minimize 
the impacts of climate change on society. The report utilizes agricultural insurance in 
cost-effective adaptation portfolios for its agriculturally-focused case studies. In a case 
study on Maharashtra, India, for example, the ECA Working Group recommends a 
portfolio of strategies to adapt Maharashtra’s agricultural sector, including irrigation 
systems, farming techniques, crop engineering, and insurance (2009). The portfolio is 
illustrated in Appendix 2, Figure 3. It is clear that this approach to agricultural insurance, 
including agricultural insurance as part of a portfolio of strategies to improve farmers’ 
resilience to climatic variability and change, is necessary for it to be sustainable to and to 
have a long-term impact.  
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Based on the discussion of agricultural insurance above, four criteria can be 
enumerated that a sustainable agricultural insurance program that can be scaled up must 
meet: location-specific, integrative, goal-oriented, and long-term, but flexible.  
 Location-specific encompasses multiple factors; the climatic risks of a region 
must be well-understood and well-modeled and used to create appropriate 
products. The local culture must be considered when assessing the demand for the 
product; furthermore, studies show that trust can be enhanced by stakeholder 
participation in the design and implementation of insurance systems and products 
(Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, and Peppiatt 2006). Community partnership should 
be sought from the initial stages of program design. Working with an organization 
that is well-regarded and established in the community will help to obtain locals’ 
trust and participation in the program.  
 Agricultural insurance must be integrated at two levels. At the local level, it must 
be used with other strategies to improve farmers’ resilience to climate variability 
and change. This point may be the single-most important component of improving 
farmers’ livelihoods in the long-run. As stated by agro-climatologist Bertrand 
Muller, who works in Senegal for CIRAD, a French research organization of 
agriculture for development, agricultural insurance must be paired with access to 
improved inputs and well-managed farms for it to be effective (2010). This point 
will be expanded below. At a higher level, the risk from agricultural insurance 
programs should be pooled in the international reinsurance market. The second 
integration mentioned above, pooling of risk at the international level, will reduce 
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risk to local insurers who are reticent to offer agricultural insurance because of the 
high risk that it carries.  
 Goal-orientation must also occur on multiple levels. Core goals of the program 
must be defined (e.g. short-term to enable farmers to access credit, long-term to 
increase yields and to improve food security), as well as operational goals (e.g. x 
groundnut farmers purchase insurance in year 1), and finally, farmers’ goals. This 
third set of goals could be elicited from farmers by having them participate in 
educational programs that will help them to improve farming techniques and to 
gradually increase their yields and production. 
 A long-term strategy is essential for the development of agricultural insurance and 
agricultural markets. Furthermore, without a long-term approach, the impacts of 
climate change may not be considered in the design of the program, and it may 
fail to enable farmers’ adaptation to climate change. A long-term approach will 
facilitate the development of products that meet the needs of farmers with varying 
levels of experience with agricultural insurance and will enable innovation in 
product design, delivery channels, etc. This long-term strategy must be flexible, 
however, given the changing climate and often unstable social and political 
environment of developing countries. Flexibility may take many forms; for 
example, the program could offer incentives to farmers to grow crops that are 
more suitable for the changing climate.  
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V. Agricultural Insurance in Senegal  
 
 
 The Senegalese Government has been interested in developing agricultural 
insurance for many years. Its first report on agricultural insurance was published in 2004 
and recommended insurable farms and crops and a series of products to be piloted. In 
2007, the Insurance Supervisory Division of the Senegalese Government commissioned a 
report that suggested the establishment of a specialized agricultural insurance company as 
well as area-yield and drought index-based insurance. This report lacked, however, 
adequate technical and operational insight to be implemented, so the Ministry of Finance 
requested that the World Bank conduct a feasibility study of index-based insurance in 
Senegal and provide recommendations for its development (Mahul et al 2009).   
 The World Bank’s feasibility study, conducted from 2008 to 2009, provided 
insights on a range of technical and operational issues. The study included a formal crop 
risk assessment model for Senegal (called MARCS); it found that area-yield as well as 
drought index-based insurance are technically feasible in Senegal under certain 
conditions. It advised that these products be developed gradually after pilot programs for 
groundnut and millet in some of the smaller administrative districts with relatively stable 
climatic conditions. It also recommended that the specialized agricultural insurance 
company proposed in the Insurance Supervisory Division’s report, a public-private 
partnership, be provided with extensive technical support and rely less on direct 
government subsidization of insurance premiums (set at 50%) (Mahul et al 2009). 
  During the researching and writing of this study, the Senegalese Government 
continued developing the National Agricultural Insurance Company of Senegal 
(CNAAS) in partnership with domestic insurance companies, farmer organizations, and 
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regional reinsurers (Ndiaye 2009). CNAAS was created in July, 2008, approved by the 
regional insurance regulator, the Inter-African Conference for the Insurance Market 
(CIMA) in December, 2008, and authorized by the Minister of Finance in February 2009 
(Ndiaye 2010).  
According to the Director of CNAAS, Amadou Ndiouga Ndiaye, the products and 
development strategy recommended in the World Bank study were too limited, so 
CNAAS used them as models but expanded them to create its products (2010). CNAAS 
sells crop insurance for groundnuts, rice, cotton, maize, millet, and sorghum. It offers 
multiple products for each crop: all-risk area yield-based insurance (covers drought, 
brush fires/heat waves, flooding/excessive rain, and locust invasion), named peril area 
yield-based insurance (available for fire, excessive rain, flooding, damage from wild 
animals, or damage from birds), and drought index-based insurance. Although premiums 
vary by crop, location, and level of coverage, insurance is available throughout Senegal. 
The Senegalese Government provides 50% subsidies on all premiums (Ndiaye 2009). 
  In late 2009, CNAAS began an education and awareness campaign about its 
products in villages throughout Senegal. According to Ndiaye, CNAAS holds 
information sessions in different regions, explaining its products and allowing farmers to 
ask questions. Senegalese famers are unfamiliar with insurance and often weary of 
insurers, whom most only know if a relative who has had a poor experience with one 
after a car accident (car insurance is the only mandatory insurance in Senegal). Despite 
these challenges, Ndiaye says that Senegalese farmers are very interested in CNAAS’s 
products. The company has not yet sold a significant number of contracts, but he believes 
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that sales will increase and that CNAAS will achieve its goal of having local branches 
throughout Senegal (2010).   
 Although CNAAS can be commended as a first step toward developing 
agricultural insurance in Senegal, there are many problems with its design and 
implementation. These problems include: 
 Inexperience with agricultural insurance: The World Bank study notes that 
CNAAS needs significant technical assistance (technical, financial, and 
operational), which is currently limited in Senegal (Mahul et al 2009). CNAAS is 
the first company of its kind to be establishing in West Africa, and its 
administrators do not have experience in agricultural experience.  
 Vague business plan and poorly-defined products: The issue above is linked to the 
vagueness of CNAAS’s business plan. CNAAS states that it insures a wide 
variety of crops, locations, and indemnification levels. It does not appear, 
however, to have developed an understanding of the risk of this product portfolio; 
it is unlikely that its current product line is actuarially sound. Its strategy of trying 
to cover the maximum number of farmers with poorly defined products may 
exceed its institutional capacity. If it defaults on the payment of claims, farmers 
will loose trust in agricultural insurance, stunting or entirely debilitating its long-
term development. These problems are likely at least partially due to the rapid 
speed with which CNAAS has been approved, developed, and launched. 
 Reliance on Senegalese Government: The Senegalese Government has a 35% 
stake in CNAAS, investing $1.1 million in its establishment (Ndiaye 2009). The 
Government is responsible for paying 50% subsidies on farmers’ premiums; for 
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the first year of its operations, CNAAS estimates that these subsidies will total 
$2.7 million (Mahul et al 2009). This amount will grow as more farmers purchase 
insurance, increasing the contribution of the Senegalese Government each year. 
Given the constant financial stress faced by the Government and lessons from 
international experience with agricultural insurance, this reliance is unwise. 
Furthermore, the Meteorological Service of the Senegalese Government provides 
weather data to CNAAS. According to a source knowledgeable in this field, the 
Government has misreported agricultural statistics for the past two years and has 
an incentive to do so when altering statistics impacts its costs and revenues. 
Misreporting could result in manipulations of payouts to farmers.  
 Lack of understanding of farmers’ needs and demand for agricultural insurance: 
CNAAS is trying to achieve near blanket coverage of Senegalese farmers by 
offering a wide variety of products with different levels of coverage. A diverse 
product offering will not increase uptake, however, if products do not meet the 
needs of Senegalese farmers. In a 2006 survey of farmers in the central, primary 
groundnut-growing region of Senegal, 71.7% of poor farmers and 68.2% of non-
poor farmers cited “Lack of seeds” as the main reason why they reduced their 
cultivated area (only 8.3% of poor and 6.2% of non-poor farmers listed “Adverse 
climatic conditions). Once the “Lack of seeds” concern was removed, however, 
the primary response of poor farmers and secondary response of non-poor farmers 
became “Adverse climatic conditions” (Mahul et al 2009). These responses 
illustrate that agricultural products in isolation may not be of much interest or aid 
to Senegalese farmers.  
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VI. An Alternative for Senegal 
 
 The concerns about CNAAS as well as the discussion of agricultural insurance in 
the preceding section demonstrate the desirability of an alternative strategy for 
developing agricultural insurance and improving Senegalese farmers’ resilience to natural 
catastrophes and climate change. As previously discussed, this strategy must be location-
specific, goal-oriented, integrative, and long-term, but flexible. With these criteria in 
mind, a brief discussion of farmers’ needs and an interesting food security program 
created by a Peace Corps Senegal volunteer will inform strategy recommendations for 
Senegal.  
 The 2009 World Bank study includes the results of a 2004 qualitative assessment 
of the principal causes of crop production losses as reported by 1500 irrigated and non-
irrigated farms selected throughout Senegal. Among the non-irrigated farms, which 
comprise over 95% of cropping in Senegal, drought is listed by 29% of farmers as the 
most important cause (of all causes listed) of crop loss. Insects (excluding locusts) follow 
at 16%, then disease with 13% (Mahul et al 2009). See Appendix B, Figure 4 for the full 
chart of losses.  
 The World Bank study also cites a survey of groundnut farmers in the primary 
groundnut-growing region of Senegal conducted in 2006. As mentioned above, farmers’ 
main reason for reducing cultivated area was lack of seeds, with an overwhelming 71.7% 
of poor farmers and 68.2% of non-poor farmers. With this obstacle removed, among poor 
farmers, the most cited reason became adverse climatic conditions (29.1%), followed by 
lack of fertilizer (16.1%), followed by poor seed quality (11.6%). Among non-poor 
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farmers, the most cited reason became lack of fertilizer (29.7%), followed by adverse 
climatic conditions (19.5%), followed by lack of equipment (11.8%) (Mahul et al 2009). 
See Appendix B, Table 3 for the full table of reasons.  
 These surveys highlight an important point stressed in the World Bank study, that 
any crop insurance program for Senegalese farmers will only be effective if it is 
accompanied by timely access to improved seeds, fertilizers, and credit. Output markets 
and sales prices must also be attractive to growers to make an investment in new and 
potentially riskier technology attractive (2009). An interesting program started by a Peace 
Corps volunteer in a village in Kolda underlines the potential of a strategy that includes 
the aforementioned inputs, farmer education, and agricultural credit.  
 Hans Spalholz, an agriculture graduate from Cornell, volunteered with Peace 
Corps in Senegal from 2007 to 2009. Hans was located in the Kolda region of southern 
Senegal. When Hans arrived in 2007, farmers in his village were struggling to produce 
enough food to feed their families; farmers’ yields were low because of soil erosion and 
depletion as well as climatic variability (Peace Corps 2009). Hans began a program that 
coupled access to improved inputs with education about farming techniques.  
 Hans began working with farmers in the dry season, meeting with them one-on-
one to explain the significance of proper spacing, the advantages of weeding, the 
advantages of retaining manure in the fields (rather than burning it), the optimal 
application of fertilizer, and the benefits of purchasing improved seed varieties. Because 
farmers could not afford to purchase improved seeds and fertilizer, Hans created a loan 
program where he loaned farmers money to purchase them. Typical loans ranged from 
$25 to $75, and farmers had to match Hans’s contribution. Throughout the rainy season, 
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Hans reviewed key points with farmers, meeting with them both in and out of the fields 
to monitor their progress. Both farmers and their families were educated about proper 
farming techniques. At the end of the season, farmers used the proceeds from the sale of 
their harvest to repay the loans that Hans had given (Peace Corps 2009).  
 The combination of improved farming techniques with better seed varieties and 
fertilizer application had outstanding results. Despite less favorable rains in 2008 than in 
2007, maize yields were six times the previous year’s yields and millet yields were 
almost doubled for farmers involved in Hans’s program. In 2007, the average yield for 
maize in this village was 500 kg/ha; in 2008, it was 3125 kg/ha. For the 2008 season, 
farmers that chose to participate in Hans’s program had average millet yields of 2200 
kg/ha; those who did not participate averaged 1250 kg/ha. For maize, the return on 
investment of participating farmers averaged 425% (Peace Corps 2009).  
 The success of Hans’s program helped facilitate a partnership between Peace 
Corps Senegal and the United States Agency for International Develop (USAID) 
focusing on long-term strategies for improving food security in Senegal (Hendrick 2010). 
Although micro-lending is beyond the capacity of Peace Corps as an institution, Chris 
Hendrick, the Director of Peace Corps Senegal, acknowledges that access to credit for 
improved inputs is one of the crucial missing links in improving yields in Senegal (2010). 
For this reason, one of the strategic focuses of the Peace Corps/USAID program is to 
facilitate the expansion of rural communities’ access to appropriate sources of credit 
(USAID 2009). 
 Although Hans’s program does not explicitly include an insurance component, it 
highlights an important role for agricultural insurance to play in the first phase of 
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agricultural insurance development in Senegal. As illustrated by the surveys of 
Senegalese farmers summarized in the World Bank study, farmers lack access to the 
credit that Hans made available to the farmers in his village. With no access to credit, 
farmers lack sufficient funds to purchase improved inputs such as fertilizer and quality 
seeds.  
The Malawi pilot explained above illustrates how agricultural insurance can 
replace Hans in opening access to improved inputs; by bundling a loan for inputs with 
agricultural insurance, banks will be more willing to lend to farmers because the 
insurance guarantees repayment of the loan. Without the educational component of 
Hans’s program and other strategies to strengthen agricultural markets, however, a 
bundled loan-insurance program will not improve the Senegalese agricultural sector in 
the long-term. It should be noted, however, that institutionalizing and upscaling Hans’s 
program through agricultural insurance is also insufficient without infrastructure 
development and crop price stabilization. For example, if Senegalese farmers are able to 
achieve anywhere near the dramatic yield increases seen in Hans’s villages, but are 
unable to store their crops for later sale, prices will plummet following the harvest and 
then begin to rise again during the dry season, eroding the profitability of farmers’ 
investments (Brown et al 2009).  
 
VII. Proposed Strategy for Senegal 
 
 Having discussed the weak Senegalese agricultural sector, the challenges facing 
this sector from climate change, the opportunities and limitations of agricultural 
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insurance (exemplified through a discussion of international agricultural insurance 
experiences), the stated needs of Senegalese farmers, and the potential impact of 
programs combining access to inputs with farmer education, it is time to return to the four 
criteria for successfully developing agricultural insurance, location-specific, integrative, 
goal-oriented, and long-term, but flexible, and elaborate a strategy for Senegal. 
 It is helpful to begin by enumerating an initial set of goals of developing 
agricultural insurance; these goals will require updating as agricultural insurance is 
established. The goals stated here are aspirational goals. When an actual program is being 
established, explicit goals that are difficult, but achievable, with specific metrics for 
measurement must be clarified. An initial set of aspirational goals is as follows: 
 Enable farmers to access inputs (e.g. drought-resistant seeds, fertilizer, etc.) that 
will increase resilience to natural catastrophes and provide higher-yields. 
 Provide farmers with coverage against catastrophic events that exacerbate the 
cycle of poverty and curtail investment in higher-revenue earning crops. 
 Promote adaptation to climate change. 
 Facilitate the modernization of the Senegalese agricultural sector and contribute to 
the development of stable agricultural markets that will improve food security. 
It is clear that these goals will not be achieved through the use of agricultural insurance 
alone; agricultural insurance must be integrated with a portfolio of complementary 
strategies. Integration requires long-term collaboration among organizations working in 
Senegal. There is a wide variety of organizations currently working on food security in 
Senegal; however, their activities are not well-coordinated and therefore neither as 
effective nor as sustainable as possible (Hendrick 2010). For this program to be impactful 
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in the long-run, it will require an international organization such as the World Bank to 
facilitate the involvement of governmental and non-profit aid organizations in Senegal.  
 As Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, and Peppiatt emphasize in their discussion of 
disaster micro-insurance, partner organizations must be well-established in Senegal and 
well-respected by the Senegalese (2006). This location-specific concern is especially 
salient for purveying insurance products because the Senegalese are skeptical of 
insurance companies; an agricultural insurance program will require that farmers be 
educated about insurance products. The organizations working directly with rural 
Senegalese must be especially well regarded; Peace Corps Senegal, for example, has been 
working there since 1963 and is respected throughout the country (Peace Corps 2009). 
Well-established organizations in Senegal also have insight into how to connect with 
Senegalese communities. For instance, Peter Trenchard, Economic Growth Office 
Director of USAID explains that because communities know that USAID is a reliable 
organization, they will compete to be selected to participate in proposed USAID projects. 
USAID hires facilitators from the local community that are knowledgeable in the project 
field, speak the local language, and are outgoing, strong communicators; the local 
community then questions the facilitators and votes on which one it wants to have work 
on the project (2010).  
 As noted in the discussion of criteria for successfully developing agricultural 
insurance, this program must be developed as a long-term strategy. The development of 
agricultural insurance can be thought of in phases; as the program moves through stages, 
it will be expanded, new products will be offered in regions with more experience with 
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agricultural insurance, and the strategies and goals of the program will change. The 
World Bank must monitor and evaluate the program’s progress on goals.  
 Although it is desirable and necessary for the Senegalese government to support 
the program in the long-term, a public-private partnership agricultural insurance company 
such as CNAAS should not be established to sell agricultural insurance. Instead, an 
insurance pool of domestic insurers should be created (see Appendix C for further 
discussion of the proposed insurance pool). The benefits of an insurance pool are 
multifarious; a principal advantage of an insurance pool is that it spreads the risk among 
insurers, which lowers costs and is most valuable in the case of an extreme natural 
catastrophe that results in many claims (Leftley 2010). Furthermore, an insurance pool 
would involve many insurance companies, enabling insurers to gain experience with 
agricultural insurance and facilitating the development of an agricultural insurance 
market in Senegal.  
 This proposed strategy also absolves the Senegalese Government of the 
responsibility of providing 50% direct subsidies on all insurance premiums. International 
experience illustrates the high-cost and ineffectiveness of high government subsidization 
(Mahul et al 2009). The Senegalese Government will play, however, many other 
supporting roles to the program. Initially, the Government will facilitate the 
establishment of a supportive legislative framework for index-based agricultural 
insurance, a key recommendation of the World Bank study (Mahul et al 2009).  
 The Senegalese Government can also indirectly lower premiums to farmers by 
investing in infrastructure development; modernization of the weather station system, for 
example, will lower basis risk and decrease premiums. Currently, basis risk posed by the 
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diffused weather station system is a major challenge to offering affordable insurance to 
farmers (Muller 2010). Investment in storage facilities and improved roads in rural areas 
will also stabilize market prices for agricultural goods. In the future, if the Senegalese 
Government would like to promote the cultivation of currently underutilized high-value 
crops such as cassava, sweet potato, pigeon pea, fonio, sesame, and cashew (USAID 
2009), it can provide subsidies on insurance policies for these crops. In this case, 
subsidies are provided for specific crops as part of economic policy to develop nascent 
agricultural markets.  
 This proposal focuses on the long-term development of agricultural insurance; it 
provides, however, the following strategy for the first phase of its development. This 
strategy is based on the four goals above as well as the Malawi experience and Peace 
Corps’s food security program. The most important of the four goals in this phase is to 
enable Senegalese farmers to access credit to purchase improved inputs. The product is a 
loan for improved inputs that is bundled with insurance so that banks will lend to farmers 
to enable them to purchase improved seeds and fertilizer. The insurance is weather index-
based insurance reflective of that used in the Malawi program.  
The MARCS risk assessment tool developed by the World Bank can help 
determine where this product can be piloted; the World Bank finding that a weather 
index-based insurance pilot for groundnuts is possible in the Nioro and Kaffrine 
departments of Senegal suggest that these locations are good options (Mahul et al 2009). 
Area-yield index insurance is not employed in this proposal; it has had mixed results 
internationally (e.g. in countries such as India), at least partially because of delays caused 
by the lengthy process involved in calculating regional average yields (2009). There are, 
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however, some interesting area-yield and weather index blended insurance products 
being developed; these products may be able to be introduced in Senegal in the future. 
Appendix C contains an in-depth discussion of a proposed structure for the initial phase 
of agricultural insurance in Senegal, including a diagram of stakeholders and their 
interactions.  
 The duration of the initial phase will depend on the challenges that arise in its 
development and the interest of Senegalese farmers. When it has been determined that the 
program is ready to enter its second phase, new regions can be added and new strategies 
employed in the pilot region. Before the second phase begins, the performance of the 
program must be evaluated based on the metrics determined at its onset. Feedback from 
farmers and surveys of their needs must be conducted. Finally, climate change impacts 
must be evaluated and considered before entering a second phase of program 
development. 
New regions will have programming and products similar to those in the initial 
pilot phase. Regions where farmers have been participating for multiple growing seasons 
will continue to have bundled loan/insurance products offered, but will also begin to have 
voluntary insurance products developed. These products are more reflective of those 
discussed in the World Bank study; voluntary insurance products are not offered until the 
second phase of program development because international experience proves that 
uptake of voluntary insurance products, even when extremely beneficial to farmers, is 
low (Cole et al 2009). This proposal assumes that farmers that have had positive 
experiences with the program in the past and have seen improvements in their 
productivity will be more apt to purchase voluntary insurance products.  
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 At the start of the second phase of the program, new, complementary programs 
can be established in the regions that participated in the initial program phase. It is 
difficult to foresee what types of programs may be beneficial for farmers; it may be 
determined, for example, that a savings program is beneficial to help farmers cope with 
interannual weather variability. Or, in the case that climate change has drastically altered 
weather conditions, an educational campaign about adapting crop portfolios may be 
valuable. These two examples illustrate the need to constantly evaluate the needs and the 
challenges faced by farmers.  
 The further into the future one looks, the more challenges and opportunities for 
the program become apparent. One clear challenge is the expense involved in upscaling 
the program and offering voluntary insurance products. Because one of the strategic 
focuses of this program is to facilitate adaption to climate change and to provide food 
security, there may be opportunities for the program to access funds earmarked for 
climate change adaptation in Senegal. The United Nations Development Project, for 
example, has funds available for adaption projects through the Global Environment Fund 
(GEF). Currently, Senegal does not have programming sponsored by these funds, 
although GEF funds are being used to help support the food security agricultural 
insurance program in Mali mentioned in Section IV (Drunet 2010). Insurance premiums 
may also be lowered through cross-subsidization (i.e. premiums of non-poor farmers are 
used to subsidize poor farmers). This option requires differentiation of poor and non-poor 
farmers, which according to Ndiaye is not difficult in Senegal (2010), and may require a 
legislative framework that requires insurers to subsidize poor farmers’ premiums with 
those of non-poor farmers (e.g. current pro-poor legislation in India requires insurers to 
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use premiums of wealthy clients to subsidize those of poor clients (Mechler, Linnerooth-
Bayer, and Peppiatt 2006)).  
 The impacts of climate change discussed in Section II, which are primary drivers 
for establishing this program, will also challenge the affordability of insurance for 
farmers. In theory, as climate change stress becomes more acute, premiums will rise to 
reflect increased risk. This problem requires further research and product innovation; 
however, if insurance products are sold only to farmers who have been educated about 
improving farming techniques and adapting to climate change, then climate change risks 
will be partially mitigated. New products can also directly address climate change risks. 
Mahul and Stutley suggest drought adaption insurance, which could provide coverage 
against risks caused by a shift from nonviable farming to viable (agricultural and 
nonagricultural) businesses. The product would protect farmers against new sources of 
risks resulting from a change to farming practices that are more drought resilient and less 
water intensive. The World Bank is currently piloting these strategies with the 
government of India (2010).  
 Another innovation that should be considered in future phases of agricultural 
insurance in Senegal is long-term, or multi-year, insurance contracts. These contracts 
would be reflect the approach that Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan develop for long-term 
homeowners’ insurance for residential property. They propose that long-term insurance 
contracts (LTI) can address the problem of volatility of insurance premiums and 
homeowners’ failure to protect their property against disaster (2009). Although LTI could 
not currently work in Senegal because of farmers’ lack of experience with insurance 
products, in the future, innovation on multi-year agricultural insurance contracts could 
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benefit farmers. LTI would help to smooth price volatility for yearly insurance contracts; 
for example, if insurers are able to access seasonal weather forecasts predict a drought 
year, they may raise premiums to unaffordable levels for farmers. A multi-year contract 
can help to address this problem by pooling the predicted risk for the covered time 
period.  
One foreseeable application of LTI in agriculture in Senegal is bundled 
loan/insurance for agricultural equipment. As noted in Section VI, in the 2006 survey of 
groundnut farmers, once the “Lack of seeds” hurdle was removed, 11.8% of non-poor 
farmers cited “Lack of equipment” as the main reason for reducing cultivated area 
(Mahul et al 2009). Non-poor farmers unable to access credit for expensive equipment 
purchases could benefit from a contract that bundled the loan with LTI so that farmers 
could repay the loan over multiple growing seasons, with insurance covering his 
payments or enabling him to delay repayment without penalty in the case of drought.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
 
 The strategy articulated for Senegal in this research paper is by no means a 
comprehensive strategy ready for immediate implementation. There are many challenges 
to developing agricultural insurance in Senegal, and not all of them are addressed by this 
proposal. This proposal does consider, however, certain options that are not currently 
discussed as part of agricultural insurance development in Senegal. The goal of this paper 
is to spur discussion about the implications of the proposed strategy for the development 
of agricultural insurance in Senegal as well as to raise consideration of how the ideas 
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offered above can be incorporated into the development of agricultural insurance 
programs in Senegal and more broadly in other developing countries. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of “Great Natural Catastrophes” Worldwide, 1950-2007, Economic 
vs. Insured Impact (U.S. $ billion indexed to 2007) 
 
Source: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2008 
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Table 1: The 40 Most Devastating Disasters Ranked by Number of Victims, 1970-2007 
 
 
Source: Hochrainer et al, 2009 
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Table 2: Examples of the Impact of Disasters on Economies of Different Sizes 
 
Source: Cummins and Mahul, 2008 
 
Figure 2: 2005 Rainfall Map of Senegal (mm)  
 
Note: Left and bottom axes represent, respectively, degrees of longitude and latitude. 
Source: Official website of the Senegalese government: 
http://www.gouv.sn/meteo/precipitations.html 
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Table 3: Senegal: Average Annual Rainfall for Selected Departments according to N-S 
Geographical Location 
 
Source: Mahul et al, 2009 
 
Table 4: Cultivated Area Main Crops, 2005/06 to 2007/08 (hectares) 
 
Source: Mahul et al, 2009 
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Figure 3: National Average Yields Major Crops, 1970/71 to 2007/08 (kg/ha) 
 
Source: Mahul et al 2009 
 
Figure 4: Course grain yield statistics from five selected countries from the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
 
Source: Brown, Hintermann, and Higgins, 2009 
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Figure 5: Change in temperature and rainfall for Africa, between 1980-1999 and 2080-
2099 for scenario A1B, averaged over 21 Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation 
Models. 
 
Source: Conway 2009 
 
Figure 6: Climatic Zones of West Africa 
 
Source: Perret 2008 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 1: Index-based agricultural insurance product 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Examples of agricultural insurance programs in developing countries 
Payout 
Index 
Trigger 
Level 
Maximum 
Payout 
Exit 
Level 
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Name/Provider WINCROP 
(Windward 
Islands Crop 
Insurance) BASIX/KBS 
World Bank 
CRMG Pilot 
Program 
World Bank 
CRMG Pilot 
Program 
United Nations 
Development 
Program Pilot 
Country Dominica, 
Grenada, St. 
Vincent, St. 
Lucia India Malawi Ethiopia Mali 
Inception Year 1988 2003 2005 2006 2010 
Default year, 
completion of 
pilot, or 
continuation 
of program 
Disintegrating Continues 
Continues, 
upscaling 
Development 
continues 
First stage of 
pilot 
Delivery Model 
Full-service 
Partner agent, 
individual 
registration 
Loan through 
MFI, MFI 
purchases 
insurance, 
NASFAM works 
with farmers 
Cooperatives sell 
products 
Products sold 
through MFIs, 
unknown model 
Role of 
Administrator 
in Community 
banana-
marketing 
organizations 
Rural 
microfinance 
organization 
(BASIX) and 
rural bank KBS 
Local farmers' 
clubs and 
National 
Smallholder 
Farmers' 
Association of 
Malawi 
(NASFAM) 
Cooperatives 
distributed 
products 
MFIs well-
regarded in 
communities 
Community 
Participation 
in scheme 
Established by 
farmer-members 
of organizations No participation 
Yes: groundnut 
farmers 
organized by 
National 
Smallholder 
Farmers' 
Association of 
Malawi 
(NASFAM) Cooperatives No participation 
Product type 
Compulsory for 
organization 
members in all 
but St. Lucia 
(voluntary) Voluntary 
Bundled 
contract: farmers 
receive hybrid 
groundnut 
seeds, insurance 
on loan for seeds  
Farmer purchase 
index-based 
insurance on 
crops 
Unknown, 
although project 
goals to develop 
insurance 
products and 
unlock access to 
credit 
Premium 
5% of sales 
255-900 
rupees/year; 3% 
of insured value 
6-10% of insured 
assets Unknown 
Products in 
design stage 
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Cover 
20% of loss of 
deliveries 
8,000-30,000 
rupees 
When rainfall 
index hits trigger, 
borrower pays 
fraction of loan 
due and insurer 
pays the rest 
directly to bank Unknown 
Products in 
design stage 
Risks covered 
well modeled? 
Likely Unknown, likely 
Likely, although 
some basis risk 
Difficulty 
obtaining 
adequate 
weather data Yes 
Incentives 
prevention? Somewhat 
Index-based, no 
moral hazard 
Index-based, no 
moral hazard Index-based Index-based 
Clients 
13,000 (2004) ~7,700 
982 (2005), 2536 
(2006) 
Initial pilot 28 
farmers 
Cotton farmers 
(first stage), will 
be expanded to 
rice, maize, and 
peanut farmers 
Insurance 
Company 
Involvement 
Yes 
Yes, Indian 
insurer ICICI 
Lombard 
Insurance 
Association of 
Malawi (IAM) -- 
consortium of 
Malawi's leading 
insurers 
Ethiopian 
Insurance 
Corporation 
(state-owned 
insurance 
company) 
selected for pilot 
Allianz Mali, local 
insurer, has 
license to 
distribute 
products 
Reinsurance 
Yes: 85% of 
portfolio 
reinsured 
internationally 
Yes, 
international 
reinsurer 
Unclear; 
probably 
purchased by 
insurer 
Small size of 
pilot program 
enabled EIS to 
retain risk 
Swiss Re 
reinsurer for all 
agricultural 
insurance 
programs 
Assistance Yes: Because 
WINCROP 
required to settle 
claims within 38 
days, 
governments 
have standby 
$7.5 mil fund 
until reinsurance 
available 
Yes: Commodity 
risk management 
group (CRMG) of 
World Bank 
contributed 
technical 
assistance to set 
up 
Yes: World Bank 
technical 
assistance, 
catalyzing 
function 
World Bank 
CRMG provided 
technical 
assistance and 
administrated 
scheme 
UNDP, Oxfam, 
Planet 
Guarantee, 2 
other NGOs 
Government 
Role 
Yes Unknown 
Provide weather 
data; no direct 
subsidization 
Supporting 
functions through 
insurance, 
weather data, 
and regulatory 
framework 
In-kind support 
through 
supportive 
legislation and 
weather data 
Major event 
experienced? 
Yes: between 
1988-2004, total 
of $75mil paid for 
267 events 
Smaller events 
with payouts 
Small payouts in 
some regions No No 
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Outlook (plan 
for commercial 
viability?) Viability 
challenged as 
banana exports 
and profitability 
decreasing 
Quick upscaling, 
large demand, 
premiums 
substantial 
Should lead to 
higher yield-
higher risk 
activities but no 
evidence yet; 
premiums 
substantial 
Much work 
needed on 
product and 
availability; 2006 
offering of similar 
product had very 
low uptake 
Too early to 
predict 
Other 
weaknesses 
High premiums 
and low payouts 
have lead to 
farmer 
disengagement -
- where voluntary 
in St. Lucia 
farmers have 
opted out, others 
are in arrears 
Eligibility is 
limited to farmers 
with crop loans 
issued by KBS; 
many farmers 
listed previous 
years claim 
payouts as 
reason for joining  
Certified seed 
packages did not 
germinate well, 
had potential to 
erode trust in 
scheme 
Cooperatives 
lack technical 
capacity to sell 
products, much 
"training of 
trainers" 
required, much 
education of 
farmers needed 
Too early to 
predict 
Other 
strengths 
Provides funds 
quickly to clients 
after loss 
Significant efforts 
have been made 
to offer a 
transparent 
product 
customized to 
each location, 
crop, and 
community  
Increased 
access to credit 
for farmers; high 
cost of loan 
interest and 
insurance 
premium 
outweighed by 
improved 
productivity 
Products seen 
as desirable in 
current climatic 
conditions 
All organizations 
involved in pilot 
have extensive 
experience 
working in this 
field (barring 
MFIs) 
Other 
information 
Difficult to 
maintain scheme 
because 
reinsurance too 
expensive for 
multi-crop 
systems, 
government 
subsidies 
demanded but 
not implemented 
Clients value the 
quick payouts 
available when 
index is 
triggered, 
although no 
changes in 
farming practices 
(moves to 
higher-risk, 
higher-yield 
crops) have 
been recorded, 
they are 
expected 
Couples 
microlending 
with mandatory 
crop insurance: 
purchase 
insurance when 
taking loan and 
premium is paid 
with loan 
payments 
Rainfall deficit 
product for 
maize first 
product piloted 
Examining both 
average-yield 
based index and 
rainfall-based 
index products, 
goal of project to 
improve food 
security 
Source: Author 
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Figure 2: Logistics of the Malawi pilot insurance scheme  
 
Source: Suarez et al 2007 
 
Table 2: The economics of the insurance/loan/seed package 
 
Source: Suarez et al 2007 
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Figure 3: Portfolio of proposed strategies for climate change adaption in Maharashtra, 
India.  
 
Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group 2009 
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Figure 4: Causes of Loss in Rain-fed Crops 
 
Source: Mahul et al 2009 
 
Table 3: Main Reason Given by Farmers in Groundnut Basin for Reducing their 
Cultivated Area 
 
Source: Mahul et al 2009 
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Appendix C 
 
External assistance
to program
MFIs
Insurance
Pool
Partner Organizations
Farmers’
Organizations
Senegalese Government
Météo Sénégal
Direction des Assurances
Infrastructure InvestmentsTechnical Partner
 
 
Stakeholder involvement in the initial phase of agricultural insurance development in 
Senegal: 
 Insurance Provider: Insurance Pool consisting of the 13 members of the 
Fédération Sénégalaise des Sociétés d’Assurance (FSSA) that offer property 
insurance. Percentage stakes will vary according to size of the insurer. There are 
two options for the administration of the pool’s business: 1) Allianz Assurances or 
2) a technical partner. Allianz Assurance is selected as administrator for three 
reasons: 1) it has experience with agricultural insurance in other developing 
countries, including a current pilot program with cotton in Mali (Planet Guarantee 
2009); 2) it has publically stated its commitment to developing micro-insurance, 
including agricultural insurance (Anthony 2008); and 3) its Senegal life insurance 
division has already developed at least three products with Planet Guarantee in 
Senegal that are in the market (Blaziat 2010). Allianz’s size and international 
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presence are also assets. If Allianz is selected as the administrator, however, then 
extensive technical training would be required because its Senegal division lacks 
experience with agricultural insurance. Option 2 is discussed below. Reinsurance 
layers will be purchased. 
 Technical Partner: During the start-up phase of this program, it would likely be 
very desirable to have an experienced technical partner. A technical partner would 
be responsible for designing products that meet farmers’ needs, working with 
partner organizations to administer the product, and coordinating with insurance 
companies when claims are filed; put simply, this partner would be the “back 
office” of the program. There are numerous well-known firms and non-profit 
organizations (NGOs) that are insurance intermediaries. Planet Guarantee is an 
NGO with an established base in Dakar that is currently acting as the technical 
partner in an agricultural insurance pilot program in Mali; although Planet 
Guarantee Senegal does not have experience working with agricultural insurance, 
they have partnerships with multiple credible MFIs and Allianz as well as 
experience in the Senegalese market (Sow 2010). MicroEnsure is a for-profit firm 
with a well-developed back office process for administering micro-insurance. 
MicroEnsure is currently piloting programs in Tanzania and Rwanda (Leftley 
2010). Although MicroEnsure does not have experience in the Senegalese market, 
its expertise would be an asset to the program. 
 A third option for the technical administration of the program is to develop the 
program with a technical partner with a fixed duration contract (e.g. 4, 5, or 6 
years) while insurers build technical capacity; at the end of the contract, technical 
administration transfers to the insurance pool. This option has pros and cons. The 
immediate benefit is that the program is launched with an experienced technical 
team. Because there will likely be many initial problems, this advantage will be 
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valuable. Another benefit is that less initial training is required, allowing for a 
more immediate program launch and enabling the insurance pool a generous 
timeline to develop its technical capacity. A clear disadvantage of this strategy is 
that with the technical partner acting as the interface between the MFIs and the 
insurance pool, these stakeholders do not gain experience working together. There 
are ways to circumvent this problem, but it should be recognized. Another 
potential problem is the loss of technical capacity when this responsibility is 
transferred to the insurance pool; if the technical partner employs processes that it 
is unable or unwilling to transmit to insurance pool administrators at the end of its 
contract, the result could be mismanagement that undermines the program. 
 
 Micro-finance Institutions: Micro-finance is well established in West Africa, and 
there are several credible MFIs operating in Senegal. MFIs are good distributors 
of agricultural insurance products because they have a presence in rural areas and 
are trusted by the Senegalese (Sow 2010). Furthermore, MFI partners will be 
necessary in order to pair agricultural insurance with loans for inputs, an essential 
component of this proposal. MFI partners will vary depending on the region in 
Senegal; MFIs must be well-established in their communities, have low 
delinquency and default rates, and possess adequate resources to participate in the 
program. Mutual saving organizations are also established in many regions in 
Senegal; these organizations are capitalized by their members and offer credit 
lines to their members. Although these organizations may be potential partners in 
this program, they vary greatly in size and capacity and so should be well-
reviewed before partnerships are established. 
 Senegalese Government: Although the Senegalese Government does not play a 
direct role in the structure of the program, it plays multiple important facilitating 
roles in support of it. One of the objectives of the program will be to remain 
affordable for farmers without direct subsidization of premiums; minimally, 
premiums must reflect the farmers’ pure risk. Furthermore, if the integrity of its 
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data can be insured, the Agence Nationale de la Météorologie (Météo) can 
provide the weather data to lower expenses that would be reflected in the 
administrative gross-up of the premium. The Direction des Assurances (DA) can 
also facilitate the program’s development by building a supportive regulatory 
framework and working with CIMA, the West and Central African insurance 
regulator, to develop index-based insurance (Mahul et al 2009).  
 Farmers’ Organizations: It may be financially and/or logistically necessary to 
partner with farmers’ organizations to distribute the insurance. This option may be 
desirable if farmers’ organizations are organized and have relationships with 
farmers who otherwise would not partake in the scheme (i.e. farmers who would 
be hesitant if approached by an MFI or “external” partner). The role of farmers’ 
organizations will vary depending on region and insurance type. One option that 
can be evaluated for regions where basis risk poses a serious problem is selling 
group policies to a local farmer’s organization; aggregating the individual farmers 
into one larger policy will pool their risk and better reflect the region’s weather 
index. The farmer’s organization is be responsible for distributing any payouts to 
members or redistributing profits from crop sales (this option transfers a portion 
of the basis risk to the farmers’ organization) (Muller 2010).  
 Partner Organizations: This proposal advances an official partnership between 
this program and the Global Food Security Response Partnership Program, a 
collaboration between the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Senegal Peace Corps. This Program leverages funding from 
USAID to enable Peace Corps members in rural villages to promote food security 
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through a number of strategies, including education about proper farming 
techniques and the benefits of purchasing improved seed varieties and fertilizers 
(USAID 2009). In the partnership, Peace Corps volunteers would work with 
farmers offered the bundled loan/insurance contract that enables farmers to 
purchase improved inputs and protects them in case of natural catastrophe. 
Linking the agricultural insurance program with the Peace Corps, one of the best-
known and well-regarded aid organizations in Senegal, will be valuable for 
gaining the interest and the trust of the Senegalese. Experience with this 
partnership will inform strategies for partnering with other organizations. 
Partnering with these types of organizations will benefit all stakeholders in the 
program because improving farmers’ agricultural practices improves their yields 
and increases their resilience to natural catastrophes, which lowers insurers’ risk 
exposure (and subsequently, premiums). For this reason, partner organizations 
will need to communicate with the insurance provider so that the provider is 
aware of agricultural improvements that impact risk loading.  
 External Assistance (e.g. World Bank): Even if a technical partner is involved in 
the program, assistance from an organization experienced in constructing 
agricultural programs is necessary. A long-term external partner acting as a 
consultant is necessary to monitor, evaluate, and update the program.   
 Reinsurance: In the initial phase, the number of policies sold will be so small that 
the insurance pool may be able to retain the program’s risk in house. As the 
program grows, however, reinsurance layers must be purchased. International 
reinsurers such as Swiss Re and Munich Re are both active in this market.  
